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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether there is a pollution haven
e¤ect, specically, the e¤ect of environmental regulations on rm lo-
cation. Our identication uses the Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy
implemented by the Chinese government in 1998. The di¤erence-in-
di¤erences (DID) estimation shows that cities with tougher environ-
mental regulations attract less foreign direct investment (FDI). Specif-
ically, being listed as a TCZ city causes the amount of FDI to drop
by 41%. Our results are robust to various robustness checks on the
validity of the DID estimation and other estimation concerns.
Keywords: Pollution haven e¤ect; Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estima-
tion; Two control zones; Natural experiment
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1 Introduction
Extreme weather prevails worldwide, causing not only tremendous economic
losses but also signicant human casualties. For example, in 2011 the U.S.
had a record twelve weather disasters that cost more than $1 billion, accord-
ing to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.1 Environmen-
tal damage is widely blamed for such severe weather. Concerned about the
further deterioration of living environments, governments across the world
are strengthening their regulations on pollution with the hope that rms will
develop greener technologies and produce more environmentally responsible
goods. An unintended consequence, however, is that rms may respond by
reallocating production to places with less stringent environmental regula-
tions, a phenomenon known as the pollution haven e¤ect. This may not only
counteract the e¤ects of environmental policies, but also worsen the overall
scenario. For example, developing countries may manipulate their environ-
mental policies to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI), which could
lead to an increase in the overall pollution levels.
Despite much anecdotal evidence, however, empirical studies fail to pro-
vide conclusive ndings on the pollution haven e¤ect. Some studies nd no
such e¤ect,2 while others detect the e¤ect of environmental regulations on
the location choice of rms.3 As a result, the investigation on the pollution
haven e¤ect is considered to be "one of the most contentious issues in the de-
bate regarding international trade, foreign investment, and the environment"
(Kellenberg, 2009).
An inherent empirical challenge to nding the pollution haven e¤ect is
how to deal with the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations.
Much of the existing literature treats environmental regulations as exogenous
(see Levinson, 2008 for a survey). Some recent studies start to tackle the po-
tential endogeneity of environmental regulations, for example, by using either
the instrumental variable approach (see Millimet and Roy, 2011, for a survey)
or the propensity score matching method (List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and
McHone, 2003). However, both the instrumental variable estimation and the
propensity score matching method require strong identication assumptions.
For the former, instrumental variables must be exogenous, whereas for the
1For more information, see "2011 Breaks Record For Most Billion-Dollar Weather Dis-
asters" by Eyder Peralta at National Public Radio, December 7, 2011.
2For example, Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992); Levinson (1996); Becker
and Henderson (2000); Eskeland and Harrison (2003); Javorcik and Wei (2004).
3For example, Henderson (1996); List and Co (2000); Keller and Levinson (2002); List,
Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone (2003); Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009); Kellenberg
(2009).
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latter, both observables and unobservables must be matched.
We examine whether there is a pollution haven e¤ect by using a change in
environmental regulations, i.e., the implementation of the Two Control Zones
(TCZ) policy in China, as an experiment (for details about environmental
regulations in China, see Section 2).4 Specically, we explore two variations,
time (before and after the policy change) and cross-sectional (some cities had
the new environmental policy (treatment group), and others did not (control
group)), to conduct a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) analysis. Our DID esti-
mation shows that cities with tougher environmental regulation attract less
FDI, which conrms the pollution haven e¤ect. Meanwhile, the magnitude of
the pollution haven e¤ect is found to be large: strengthening environmental
regulations causes the amount of FDI to drop by around 41%.
The validity of our DID estimation hinges on the condition that the treat-
ment group would have followed the trend of the control group in attracting
FDI if they had not implemented the new environmental policy. To verify the
satisfaction of this identication assumption, we conduct a series of sensitivity
analyses, including checking any di¤erential pre-treatment time trends, in-
cluding city-specic time trend, using two alternative control groups, control-
ling for provincial factors and spatial correlation, and conducting a placebo
test, falsication tests, and an instrumental variable estimation. Our ndings
on the pollution haven e¤ect remain robust to all of these validity checks.
In addition to the change in the environmental policy, China provides an
ideal setting for investigating the pollution haven e¤ect. On the one hand,
since it adopted the open and reform policy in 1978, Chinese governments
have been aggressively attracting FDI, which has made China the largest FDI
recipient country in the world. On the other hand, Chinas fast economic
growth in recent decades has been accompanied by severe environmental de-
generation, such as over-exploration and mass industrial pollution, which are
typical problems in developing countries. Meanwhile, China is a large coun-
try with substantial di¤erences in the FDI distribution and environmental
quality across regions, which provides us with enough variations to identify
the pollution haven e¤ect.
Our study is similar to and complements the work of Hanna (2011), who
also uses a DID analysis to investigate how tough environmental regulations
in the U.S. a¤ect its outow FDI. Whereas Hanna (2011) looks at the U.S.,
the largest developed country in the world, we use data from China, the
largest developing country in the world. Meanwhile, we investigate how en-
vironmental regulations a¤ect the amount of FDI a city receives (or the FDI
4Hering and Poncet (2011) also use this setting to investigate how environmental reg-
ulations a¤ect export activity of rms.
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recipient side), whereas Hanna (2011) examines whether U.S. multination-
als reallocate their production to foreign countries in response to domestic
environmental regulations (or the FDI sourcing side).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The institutional
background of environmental regulations in China is described in Section 2.
Section 3 discusses the estimation framework of the pollution haven e¤ect,
along with a number of robustness checks on the identication assumption.
Data and variables are described in Section 4, and empirical ndings are
reported in Section 5. The paper concludes with Section 6.
2 Institutional Background of Environmental
Regulations in China
The SO2 emissions generated by coal combustion have increased substan-
tially alongside the fast economic growth in China in past decades. National
coal consumption in 1990 was 1.05 billion tons and increased to 1.28 billion
in 1995. In 1993, 62.3% cities in China had annual average ambient SO2
concentration values above the national Class II standard. In Chongqing,
the annual ambient SO2 concentration reached 270 or 4.5 times the national
Class II standard. Around the same period, 40% of the national territory
reported acid rain with average PH value lower than 5.6.
SO2 and acid rain may hurt human health and destroy ecosystems, which
may consequently impede economic growth. Concerned with its long-term
sustainable economic development, Chinese governments started to tackle
air pollution issues in the mid 1980s by implementing a series of regulatory
policies. The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the Peoples
Republic of China (APPCL) was enacted in 1987 and executed in 1988.
This new environmental law provided general principles of regulation for air
pollution for local governments and related agencies. However, the APPCL
was considered very sketchy. For example, it did not present any concrete
policies on how to control SO2 emissions or specify which government body
should be responsible for enforcing the policies. As a result, the e¤ect of the
regulation on air pollution was limited, with SO2 emissions and acid rain
continuing to increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
With a growing concern over the air pollution problem, Chinese govern-
ments decided to take more stringent measures. In 1995, the 1987 APPCL
was amended, and one chapter about the regulation on air pollution and SO2
emissions was included. More importantly, a new policy, namely the Two
Control Zones (TCZ) policy, was proposed to prevent the air quality of those
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heavily-polluted areas from deteriorating further.
The two control zones include SO2 pollution control zones and acid rain
control zones. The National Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) be-
gan designating cities as TCZ in late 1995, based on several criteria. Speci-
cally, a city was designated as a SO2 pollution control zone if: (1) its average
annual ambient SO2 concentration was larger than the national Class II stan-
dard (i.e., 0.06 mg/m3) in recent years; (2) its daily average ambient SO2
concentrations exceeded the national Class III standard (i.e., 0.25 mg/m3);
or (3) its SO2 emissions were signicant. And a city was designated as an
acid rain control zone if: (1) its average PH value of precipitation was equal
or smaller than 4.5; (2) its sulfate deposition was above the critical load; or
(3) its SO2 emissions were large.
In 1997, The Request for Approval of the Proposal of Designation for
Acid Rain Control Areas and SO2 Pollution Control Areaswas issued by
NEPB and sent to State Council for approval. In January 1998, this proposal
was approved by the State Council in the document The O¢ cial Reply of
the State Council Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas and SO2 Pollution
Control Areas. It was then put into e¤ect. Among a total of 380 cities, 175
cities were designated as TCZ. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution
of TCZ cities in China. In general, SO2 pollution control zones are located
in northern China because of the heating system, whereas acid rain control
zones are located in southern China where the climate is relatively more
humid.
Once a city was designated as TCZ, tougher regulatory policies were
implemented. For example, according to the amendment, if new thermal
power plants, medium or large rms with serious SO2 emissions were to
be built in these zones, desulfurization, dust-collecting facilities and other
required equipment must be installed. For the existing SO2-emitting plants,
SO2-reducing and dust-collecting measures must be taken.
In the 1998 approval document for the TCZ list, the State council also
laid out the targets for environmental control in TCZ cities in the short run
(2000) and in the long run (2010). Specically, for 2000, "the sources of
industrial SO2 pollution should achieve the national standard of discharg-
ing SO2. The total amount of SO2 emission should be within the required
amount. Ambient SO2 concentrations in important cities should achieve the
national standards. The acid rain in the acid rain control areas should be
alleviated." For 2010, "the total amount of SO2 emission should be lower
than that of 2000. Ambient SO2 concentrations in all cities should achieve
the national standards. The number of acid rain areas with average PH value
of precipitation equal or smaller than 4.5 should be reduced signicantly."
These new environmental regulations have generated signicant improve-
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ment in air pollution control. In 2000, 102 TCZ cities achieved the na-
tional Class II standard of average ambient SO2 concentrations and 84.3%
of severely-polluted rms achieved the target level of SO2 emissions (China
Environment Yearbook, 2001). The average growth rate of SO2 emissions
from industries and livelihood in TCZ cities from 2001 to 2006 was -6.5%
(Annual Statistic Report on Environment in China, 2007). In 2010, 94.9%
of TCZ cities had achieved the national Class II standard of average ambient
SO2 concentrations, with no city reporting values above the national Class
III standard (Report of Ministry of Environmental Protection of the Peoples
Republic of China, 2011).
In Figure 2, we report the annual average ambient SO2 concentrations for
TCZ and non-TCZ cities from 1992 to 2008 (China Environment Yearbook,
various years). There is a clear pattern of annual average ambient SO2
concentration values in TCZ cities decreasing substantially over this period.
By 2008, no city reported number above 0.1 mg/m3 and the SO2 emission
in TCZ cities became similar to those in non-TCZ cities.
3 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we rst lay out our estimation framework for the pollution
haven e¤ect and then discuss the various checks on our identication assump-
tion.
3.1 Estimation Framework
To illustrate our identication strategy for the pollution haven e¤ect, we
adopt the Rubin causal model. Assume that for city c at time t we can
observe two potential outcomes, Yct(1) and Yct(0), where Yct represents our
outcome variable, the logarithm of the amount of FDI. Yct(1) denotes the
value when there is an extremely stringent environmental regulation and
hence the value is determined by economic factors Xct as well as city time-
invariant factors (c) and yearly common shocks (t), i.e.,
Yct(1) = c + t +X
0
ct: (1)
Yct(0) denotes the value when there is no environmental regulation, i.e.,
Yct(0) = Yct(1) + ; (2)
where  > 0 captures the pollution haven e¤ect; that is, the e¤ect of envi-
ronmental regulation on the location choice of FDI.
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With these two outcome values (Yct(1) and Yct(0)), we can readily calcu-
late the pollution haven e¤ect as
  = E [Yct(1)  Yct(0)] : (3)
However, in observational data like ours, we are only able to observe one
of the two potential outcome values: either Yct(1) or Yct(0). This makes
identication of the pollution haven e¤ect through equation (3) infeasible.
To retrieve the pollution haven e¤ect, we exploit the TCZ policy that was
put into e¤ect in 1998 in China as a natural experiment to conduct a DID
analysis.
Specically, there are two groups of cities, the treatment and control
groups. The treatment group comprises cities designated as TCZ in 1998 (or
TCZ cities), whereas the control group includes cities not designated as TCZ
in 1998 (or non-TCZ cities). Denote the indicator of the treatment status
TCZc as
TCZc =

1 if city c is a TCZ city
0 if city c is a non-TCZ city
: (4)
Our DID estimator is
 DID = E [Yc1998jTCZc = 1]  E [Yc1998jTCZc = 0]
= E [Yc1998(1)  Yc1998(0)jTCZc = 1]
+ (E [Yc1998(0)jTCZc = 1]  E [Yc1998(0)jTCZc = 0])
=   + IA
(5)
where
IA = E [Yc1998(0)jTCZc = 1]  E [Yc1998(0)jTCZc = 0] (6)
Equation (6) represents our identication assumption, which states that
the treatment group would have followed the trend of the control group in
attracting FDI if they had not implemented the new environmental policy.
As long as our identication assumption is satised (i.e., IA = 0), our DID
estimator recovers the true pollution haven e¤ect, i.e., DID = .
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In regression form, our baseline DID estimation has the following speci-
cation
Yct = c + t +   TCZc  Postt +X0ct+"ct; (7)
5Note that for our DID analysis, we do not require the treatment status to be exogenous,
i.e.,
E [Yc1997(0)jTCZc = 1] 6= E [Yc1997(0)jTCZc = 0] :
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where t is the time dummy, capturing those factors common to all cities at
time t; c is the city dummy, capturing city cs all time-invariant character-
istics; Postc indicates the post-treatment period, i.e.,
Postc =

1 8t  1998
0 otherwise
; (8)
and "ct is the error term. To deal with potential heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the city level, following
Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004).
3.2 Checks on the Identication Assumption
Our identication assumption in regression form (corresponding to equation
(6)) is
E ["c1998jTCZc = 1;Xc1998;1998]
= E ["c1998jTCZc = 0;Xc1998;1998] :
(9)
It is reasonable to believe that this identication assumption holds in our
setting, because the initiation of the TCZ policy was exogenous to local gov-
ernments. Meanwhile, the designation of TCZ cities was based on several
criteria, in particular past ambient SO2 concentration values and the PH of
precipitation, and specic threshold levels, all of which could not be manip-
ulated by city governments. Nonetheless, we discuss in the following a series
of robustness checks on the identication assumption (9).
Pre-treatment di¤erential time trends. One way to check whether
the identication assumption (9) holds is to examine whether the assumption
is satised several years before the treatment, i.e.,
IAs = E ["c1998 sjTCZc = 1;Xc1998 s;1998 s]
 E ["c1998 sjTCZc = 0;Xc1998 s;1998 s]
= 0 8s  1: (10)
A nding of IAs = 0 8s  1 may imply that our identication assumption
(9) continues to hold. The corresponding regression specication is
Yct = c + t +   TCZc  Postt
+
X
s1
s  TCZc  1998 s +X0ct+"ct; (11)
and the test of s = 08s  1 corresponds to the check of IAs = 0 8s  1.
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City-specic time trend. Cities in the treatment and control groups
may follow di¤erent time trends, which may then compound our DID esti-
mate. To address this concern, we allow for city-specic time trend in our
DID estimation. Specically, the rst-di¤erenced error term in estimation
equation (7) is decomposed as
"ct = c + ~"ct; (12)
and our identication assumption (9) is relaxed as
E [~"c1998jTCZc = 1;Xc1998;1998; c]
= E [~"c1998jTCZc = 1;Xc1998;1998; c] :
(13)
The corresponding new regression specication is
Yct = c + t +   TCZc  Postt +X0ct+c  t+ ~"ct:
(14)
Matched control group. Instead of using arbitrary, non-TCZ cities as
the control group, we match each city in the treatment group with a city in
the control group based on a number of average pre-treatment city character-
isticsWc1992 1997, following List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone (2003)
and Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009). Specically, we rst estimate a Probit
regression, i.e.,
c = Pr (TCZc = 1jWc1992 1997) = F (Wc1992 1997) : (15)
Based on the predicted probability ^c, we then match each TCZ city with
a non-TCZ city that has the closest value of ^c compared to the concerned
TCZ city. Using this matched control group, we relax our identication
assumption (9) as
E ["c1998jTCZc = 1;Xc1998;1998; ^c]
= E ["c1998jTCZc = 1;Xc1998;1998; ^c] :
(16)
Meanwhile, if conditional on Xct our treatment and control groups in the
baseline estimation (7) are already balanced, then the use of this matched
control group should barely change the statistical signicance and the mag-
nitude of our baseline DID estimate, i.e., Matched = Baseline.
Surrounding non-TCZ cities as the control group. We construct
another alternative control group, specically, all of the non-TCZ cities that
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surround a TCZ city. Because neighboring cities tend to have similar eco-
nomic, social, and climate conditions, the use of this alternative control group
may improve the comparability between the treatment and control groups.
Meanwhile, we also compare the estimated magnitude from this alternative
control group to that of the baseline estimator as a check on whether the
treatment and control groups are indeed balanced in the baseline estimation,
or the satisfaction of the identication assumption (9).
Provincial factors and spatial correlation. Chinese provinces usu-
ally have di¤erent regional policies and guidelines for policy enforcement that
could potentially bias our estimate. To address this concern, we allow for any
arbitrary (time-varying or time-invariant) provincial compounding factors by
including province-time dummies. Meanwhile, the inclusion of province-time
dummies provides us with a control for the spatial correlation issues pointed
out by Drukker and Millimet (2008). The estimation specication with the
inclusion of the province-time dummies is
Yct = c + t +   TCZc  Postt + pt +X0ct+"ct; (17)
where pt is the province-time dummy, capturing all provincial time-invariant
and time-varying characteristics, and the corresponding identication as-
sumption is
E ["c1998jTCZc = 1;Xc1998;1998;p1998]
= E ["c1998jTCZc = 1;Xc1998;1998;p1998] :
(18)
Placebo test: an articial date of treatment. The NEPB be-
gan compiling the TCZ list in late 1995; hence, introducing concerns about
whether there is any expectation e¤ect, that is, the e¤ect of environmental
regulation on FDI happened before the e¤ective date of the policy. As a
robustness check, we conduct a placebo test, that is, using 1996 instead of
1998 as the time of treatment. Hence, our new DID estimator is
 ~DID = E [Yc1996jTCZc = 1]  E [Yc1996jTCZc = 0] : (19)
A nding of ~DID = 0 may not only dismiss concerns of an expectation e¤ect,
but also show that the treatment and control groups followed similar time
trends before the policy change in 1998.
Falsication tests. Instead of looking at FDI as the outcome variable,
we examine other outcome variables Zct that are supposed to be una¤ected
by the change in environmental regulations. Hence, the DID estimator of Zkct
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is
 zkDID = E

Zkc1998
TCZc = 1  E Zkc1998TCZc = 0
=  zk + IAzk = IAzk ; (20)
where z
k
= 0; and
IAz
k
= E
h
"z
k
c1998
TCZc = 1i  E h"zkc1998TCZc = 0i : (21)
A nding of z
k
DID = 08k means that the treatment and control groups are
balanced for these alternative outcome variables Zkct (i.e., IA
zk = 08k), which
may imply the satisfaction of our baseline identication assumption (9). To
choose these alternative outcome variables Zct, we use the number of buses,
the number of bus passengers, the number of middle schools, the number of
primary schools, the primary school enrolment numbers, and road area, all
in logarithm form.
Instrumental variable estimation. The TCZ assignment was based
on the criteria listed in Section 2, which creates a discontinuity in the assign-
ment variable. By exploring such discontinuity, we can construct a possibly
exogenous instrument for TCZ status. Specically, the instrumental variable
is constructed as
TCZIV = I [Mc95  m0] ; (22)
where I [:] is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the argument
in the bracket is true and 0 if false; Mc95 is the average annual ambient
SO2 concentration in 1995 for the northern cities and the average PH value
of precipitation in 1995 for the southern cities;6 and m0 is 0.06mg/m3 for
the northern cities and 4.5 for the southern cities. The rst-stage of the
instrumental variable estimation is
TCZc  Postt = c + t +   TCZIV  Postt
+ Mc95  Postt +X0ct+ct; (23)
and the second-stage is
Yct = c + t +   TCZc  Postt +  Mc95  Postt +X0ct+"ct: (24)
The inclusion of Mc95  Postt suggests that the identication of the instru-
mental variable estimation comes from discontinuity in the distribution of
6Using an average of 1994-1995 or an average of 1993-1995 as the assignment value
produces similar results (available upon request).
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the assignment variable Mc95, i.e., the identication assumption of the in-
strumental variable estimation is
E ["c1998j I [Mc95  m0] = 1;Xc1998;1998;Mc95]
= E ["c1998j I [Mc95  m0] = 0;Xc1998;1998;Mc95] :
(25)
It is reasonable to believe that the identication assumption (25) is satis-
ed, because the assignment was based on past pollutant emission values
and specic threshold levels. However, the implementation of this instru-
mental variable estimation faces two data challenges. First, we do not have
information about the PH values of precipitation. Our remedy is to use the
average annual ambient SO2 concentration to replace the PH value for south-
ern cities, because the dissolution of SO2 in water reduces the PH value and
generates acid rain, and the assignment should be comparable across north-
ern and southern cities. Second, information of average annual ambient SO2
concentrations is only available for around 80 cities, about 30% of the whole
sample. This severe sample attrition is expected to substantially increase the
standard error and hence reduce the statistical signicance of our estimated
coe¢ cient. As a result, we also report the Dubin-Wu-Hausman test, which
checks the statistical equivalence between our DID and instrumented DID
estimates, or the equivalence of identication assumptions (9) and (25).
4 Data and Variables
The data used in this study come from the following three sources:
1. Chinese City Statistical Yearbook for the period 1992 (the earliest) -
2009 (the most recent)
2. Chinese Environment Yearbook for the period 1992 (the earliest) - 2008
(the most recent)
3. The State Councils o¢ cial document, "The O¢ cial Reply of the State
Council Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas and SO2 Pollution Con-
trol Areas"
From the rst data source, we collect information about our outcome
variable, the amount of FDI, for each city during the 1992-2009 period. The
rst data source also provides information about our control variables Xct,
including the number of college students, the number of high school students,
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the number of telephones, GDP, the number of taxis, population, the number
of road areas, industrial production, and the number of retail consumptions.
To construct the matched control group, we further collect information about
total wages and tax revenue. For a detailed description of these variables,
see Appendix 1.
From the second data source, we obtain information about the annual
average ambient SO2 concentrations. The SO2 concentration statistics come
from the records of many monitoring stations in a few cities, the number
of which has steadily increased over time. For example, there were only 65
cities with records of pollution in 1992, whereas in 2003 that number rose to
113. To construct the instrumental variable, we use information from 1995,
which contains information on the value of the annual average ambient SO2
concentrations for 80 cities.
The third data source provides us with a detailed name list of cities
designated as TCZ. During our sample period (1992-2009), the composition
of this list remained unchanged. Appendix 2 supplies this list of these TCZ
cities. Among a total of 280 cities for which the Chinese City Statistical
Yearbook has information, 158 are TCZ cities.
Figure 3 shows the time trends of the logarithm of the total amount of
FDI in TCZ and non-TCZ cities during the 1992-2009 period. In general,
TCZ cities attracted more FDI than non-TCZ cities. Meanwhile, both groups
exhibited an upward trend in the amount of FDI in this time period, which
reects the e¤ects of Chinas open and reform policy and rapid economic
growth. More interestingly, before 1998 (the time of the TCZ policy became
e¤ective), TCZ and non-TCZ cities had similar time trends, except for a
sudden drop in 1997 for non-TCZ cities. After the implementation of the
TCZ policy, the growth of FDI in TCZ cities slowed while that in non-TCZ
cities caught up. At the end of the sample period (i.e., 2009), the gap in the
amount of FDI between these two groups was much smaller than it had been
at the beginning of the sample period (i.e., 1992).
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Baseline Result
Our baseline DID estimation results corresponding to equation (7) are re-
ported in Table 1. The DID estimator DID (i.e., the estimated coe¢ cient of
the interaction between the indicator of the treatment status TCZ and that
of the post-treatment period Postit) is found to be negative and statistically
signicant. This result implies that cities with tougher environmental reg-
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ulations (i.e., the TCZ policy) attract fewer FDI, conrming the pollution
haven e¤ect.
Meanwhile, the economic magnitude of the pollution haven e¤ect is also
signicant. The implementation of the TCZ policy causes the amount of FDI
to drop by 41:1%. This magnitude is larger than those found in the literature.
For example, Henderson (1996) nds a magnitude of 7  10% in the context
of 742 urban counties in the U.S. for the 1978-1987 period. Kellenberg (2009)
estimates that during 1999-2003, the failing environmental policy causes the
value added of U.S. a¢ liates located in the top 20th percentile countries to
grow by approximately 8:6% while the corresponding number for the top 20th
percentile developing and transitional economies was 32%. Hanna (2011)
nds that the Clean Air Act Amendments over the 1966-1999 period increases
U.S. multinationalsforeign assets by 5:3% and foreign output by 9%.
The estimated coe¢ cients of other economic determinants of FDI also
make economic sense. Better telecommunication infrastructure (i.e., the
number of telephones) attracts foreign investment and cities with more do-
mestic production accommodate more FDI, which supports the agglomera-
tion theories. Moreover, foreign rms are more likely to locate in cities with
larger domestic consumption.
5.2 Checks on the Identication Assumption of the
DID Estimation
Whether our DID estimator in Table 2 captures the true pollution haven
e¤ect hinges on the satisfaction of our identication assumption (9), i.e.,
IA = 0 , DID = . In this sub-section, we present the results of a se-
ries of robustness checks, as illustrated in Section 3.2, on the identication
assumption of our DID estimation.
First, Column 1 of Table 2 reports the estimation results regarding the
check on any di¤erential pre-treatment time trends according to equation
(11). Neither TCZ Prior1 (an indicator of one year before the treatment)
nor TCZ  Prior2 (an indicator of two years before the treatment) has any
statistical signicance. These ndings suggest that the treatment and con-
trol groups have similar time trends (at least) two years before the treatment,
which implies that the treatment group may follow the same trend as the con-
trol group in the case of no treatment or the satisfaction of our identication
assumption (9).
Second, we include city-specic time trend in Column 2 of Table 2. It is
found that our DID estimate of the pollution haven e¤ect remains statistically
signicant. Despite an increase in the estimated magnitude, the Hausman
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test shows that the DID estimate with the inclusion of the city-specic time
trend is statistically indi¤erent from the baseline DID estimate in Table 2.
Third, we use the propensity score matching method to match each TCZ
city with a non-TCZ city. Specically, for the matching covariates, we fol-
low List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone (2003) and Dean, Lovely, and
Wang (2009) by using total wage, population, GDP, the number of college
students, the number of high school students, the number of telephones, road
area per capita, tax revenue, and industrial production. The balancing tests
reported in Appendix 3 show that after the matching, the treatment and
control groups are balanced in all of these covariates. Estimation results
using the matched control group are reported in Column 3 of Table 2; such
that the estimator remains statistically signicant. Meanwhile, although the
estimated magnitude falls to  0:343, the Hausman test shows that it is sta-
tistically indi¤erent from the baseline DID estimate ( 0:411 in Table 1).
These results imply that the treatment and control groups are balanced in
the baseline DID estimation, which lends support to the satisfaction of our
identication assumption (9).
Fourth, we use the non-TCZ cities that surround each TCZ city as an
alternative control group. Appendix 2 reports this list for each of the TCZ
cities. Estimation results are reported in Column 4 of Table 2. It is found
that the new DID estimate resembles the baseline DID estimate in Table 1,
in both statistical signicance and magnitude. These results further verify
the use of the control group in the baseline DID estimation or the satisfaction
of our identication assumption (9).
Fifth, we include province-time dummies in Column 5 of Table 2 to control
for any arbitrary provincial time-varying and time-invariant compounding
factors and spatial correlation. Clearly, our ndings on the pollution haven
e¤ect remain robust to the inclusion of province-time dummies.
Sixth, as a placebo test, we use 1996 as the time of treatment instead
of the real e¤ective date, 1998. If there is no expectation e¤ect and the
treatment and control groups are comparable before the treatment, then the
DID estimate using 1996 as the time of treatment should not produce any
statistical signicance. Indeed, we nd that it is statistically insignicant
(Column 6 of Table 2), which reinforces the validity of our DID estimation.
Seventh, in Table 3, we report a series of falsication tests, in which we
replace our outcome variable of interest (the amount of FDI) with seven other
outcome variables that are not supposed to be a¤ected by the change in envi-
ronmental regulations. The estimation results show that none of these seven
DID estimates produce any statistical signicance and many of the estimated
magnitudes are quite close to zero. The nding that our identication as-
sumption (9) holds for these seven alternative outcome variables supports
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the validity of our DID estimation.7
Finally, Table 4 reports the instrumental variable estimation results corre-
sponding to equations (23) and (24). As shown in Column 1, the instrumental
variable is found to be positive and statistically signicantly correlated with
our regressor of interest. With respect to our central issue, the instrumented
DID estimate remains negative and its magnitude is almost identical to our
baseline DID estimate. However, as expected, due to the severe sample attri-
tion problem, the standard error of the estimated instrumented DID estimate
is quite large.8 Nonetheless, the insignicant Dubin-Wu-Hausman test show
that the instrumented DID estimate is similar to the baseline DID estimate,
which implies the satisfaction of our identication assumption (9), given that
the IV identication assumption (25) holds.
5.3 Other Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we conduct additional robustness checks on our afore-
mentioned ndings.
First, we experiment with using 1992-1995 instead of 1992-1997 as the
pre-treatment period, due to concerns about the noise introduced by the
preparation of the TCZ list in the 1995-1997 period. Estimation results are
reported in Column 1 of Table 5. Clearly, our main ndings on the pollution
haven e¤ect remain robust to the use of this alternative pre-treatment period.
Second, we exclude four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai,
and Tianjin), which have higher administrative levels and hence potentially
di¤erent government policies. Estimation results are reported in Column 2 of
Table 5. It is found that our DID estimate barely changes with the exclusion
of these four municipalities.
Third, we exclude cities without information about the amount of FDI
in 1998 because they do not have post-treatment values. Estimation results
are reported in Column 3 of Table 5. The new estimator becomes even more
statistically signicant, which further conrms our previous ndings.
7One may be concerned that the statistical insigniance is due to the lack of time
variations for these seven outcome variables. In Appendix 4, for each of these seven
outcome variables, we report the mean value and standard deviation of the coe¢ cient of
variation (dened as the standard deviation of the outcome variable for an individual city
over time divided by the corresponding mean value), which is a standard measure of the
degree of dispersion in the literature. We nd signicant time variations in these outome
variables.
8Another possible explanation for the statistical insignicance is that our instrumental
variable may be weak, as the weak identication statistic is below the conventional value
for the safety zone of strong instrument (i.e., 10; see Straiger and Stock, 1997).
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Finally, we exclude cities without information about the amount of FDI in
the 1995-1997 period because they do not have enough pre-treatment values.
As shown in Column 4 of Table 5, our main ndings on the pollution haven
e¤ect continue to hold in this sub-sample.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether there is a pollution haven e¤ect, specif-
ically, whether rms respond to environmental regulations by reallocating
their production to places with less stringent regulations. To control for the
potential endogeneity of environmental regulations, we use a change in envi-
ronmental policy, namely Chinas 1998 TCZ policy. Our identication of the
pollution haven e¤ect comes from a comparison of the outcome variable for
TCZ cities with that for non-TCZ cities before and after the policy change,
or the DID estimation.
By using the amount of FDI for 280 cities over the 1992-2009 period, we
nd that cities designated as TCZ attract around 41% less FDI than their
non-TCZ counterparts. The results are robust to a series of robustness checks
on the identication assumption, along with other econometric concerns.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the pollution haven e¤ect by
carefully addressing the endogeneity problem associated with environmental
regulations. Meanwhile, our use of data from a developing country comple-
ments existing studies that focus more on developed countries, particularly
the U.S.
17
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Figure 1: Distribution of TCZ cities 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 2: Ambient SO2 concentrations in TCZ cities and non-TCZ cities 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Total FDI inflow into TCZ cities and non-TCZ cities 
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Table 1, Baseline results 
Dependent variable: log FDI (1) 
 
TCZ * Post -0.411** 
(0.168) 
College students # (log) 0.084 
(0.067) 
High school students # (log) -0.085 
(0.095) 
Telephone # (log) 0.308** 
(0.138) 
GDP growth rate -0.396 
(0.254) 
Taxi # (log) -0.052 
(0.070) 
Road area per capita (log)  0.066 
(0.099) 
Industrial production (log) 0.366*** 
(0.105) 
Retail consumption (log) 0.286* 
(0.160) 
Constant -1.352 
(2.039) 
Year fixed effects Yes 
City fixed effects Yes 
Observations 3,013 
R-squared 0.399 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
Table 2, Checks on the identification assumption of the DID estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var:  log FDI 
Incl.  
Pre-
treatment 
Incl.  
City-time 
trend 
Matched 
control 
group  
Neighboring 
non-TCZs as 
control group  
Incl.  
Province-time 
dummies 
Use 
1996 as 
event date 
  
 
TCZ * Post -0.301* -0.460* -0.353** -0.434*** -0.305** -0.246 
(0.168) (0.261) (0.157) (0.129) (0.138) (0.158) 
TCZ * Prior1 0.045   
(0.275)   
TCZ * Prior2 0.383 -0.301*   
(0.260) (0.168)   
College students # (log) 0.085 0.026 0.131 0.090 0.066 0.083 
(0.067) (0.078) (0.095) (0.061) (0.062) (0.067) 
High school students # (log) -0.083 -0.192 -0.204** -0.089 0.040 -0.080 
(0.095) (0.120) (0.099) (0.093) (0.102) (0.096) 
Telephone # (log) 0.312** 0.000 0.416** 0.541*** 0.328** 0.326** 
(0.136) (0.000) (0.188) (0.118) (0.132) (0.138) 
GDP growth rate -0.388 0.452** 0.424 -0.366 -0.387 -0.371 
(0.255) (0.195) (0.342) (0.224) (0.237) (0.260) 
Taxi # (log) -0.051 -0.562 -0.092 -0.091* -0.008 -0.032 
(0.070) (0.527) (0.078) (0.053) (0.057) (0.068) 
Road area per capita (log)  0.068 -0.061 0.207* 0.052 0.018 0.062 
(0.098) (0.080) (0.105) (0.080) (0.080) (0.098) 
Industrial production (log) 0.367*** -0.039 0.287** 0.439*** 0.233* 0.347*** 
(0.104) (0.105) (0.126) (0.074) (0.128) (0.106) 
Retail consumption (log) 0.283* 0.505** 0.278 0.248** 0.210 0.297* 
(0.159) (0.207) (0.214) (0.116) (0.154) (0.161) 
Constant -1.602 0.104 0.400 -2.579 1.279 -1.314 
(2.063) (0.117) (2.212) (1.706) (2.348) (2.078) 
  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,013 2,413 1,481 4,486 3,013 3,013 
R-squared 0.400 0.038 0.473 0.447 0.617 0.397 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.   
Table 3, Falsification tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dep. Var:  log FDI Bus # 
Bus 
passenger # 
Middle 
school # 
Primary 
school # 
Primary school  
student # 
Total road 
area 
 
            
TCZ * Post -0.109 0.081 0.014 -0.075 0.022 0.047 
 (0.100) (0.135) (0.053) (0.111) (0.044) (0.064) 
College students # (log) 0.055* 0.087* 0.021* -0.034 -0.001 0.029 
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.011) (0.032) (0.015) (0.021) 
High school students # (log) -0.080* 0.153** 0.501*** 0.698*** 0.803*** 0.021 
 (0.046) (0.068) (0.064) (0.143) (0.051) (0.028) 
Telephone # (log) 0.038 0.059 0.091** -0.019 0.068* -0.042 
 (0.050) (0.076) (0.040) (0.049) (0.040) (0.037) 
GDP growth rate -0.248** -0.127 0.008 -0.057 0.026 -0.034 
 (0.110) (0.138) (0.040) (0.084) (0.042) (0.041) 
Taxi # (log) 0.152*** 0.179*** -0.014 -0.019 -0.001 0.023 
 (0.044) (0.053) (0.013) (0.031) (0.017) (0.029) 
Road area per capita (log)  0.022 0.087 0.009 -0.056 -0.058*** 0.733*** 
 (0.039) (0.064) (0.013) (0.034) (0.021) (0.045) 
Industrial production (log) 0.068 0.045 0.002 0.031 0.126*** 0.041 
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.017) (0.040) (0.032) (0.025) 
Retail consumption (log) 0.144* 0.184** -0.017 -0.090* 0.174*** 0.097*** 
 (0.077) (0.082) (0.030) (0.052) (0.047) (0.037) 
Constant 1.842* 0.143 -1.186 -0.515 -1.229 2.234*** 
 (1.033) (1.184) (0.913) (1.770) (0.809) (0.616) 
  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,080 2,887 2,744 2,744 3,063 3,086 
R-squared 0.574 0.485 0.719 0.620 0.803 0.857 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.   
Table 4, Instrumental variable estimation result 
  
 1st stage 2nd stage 
Dep. VARIABLES TCZ * Post  
  
  
TCZ * Post_IV 0.355***  
(0.136)  
TCZ * Post  -0.372 
 (0.872) 
College students # (log) -0.014 -0.123 
(0.022) (0.144) 
High school students # (log) 0.022 -0.029 
(0.028) (0.159) 
Telephone # (log) -0.079 0.209 
(0.046) (0.257) 
GDP growth rate -0.011 0.012 
(0.078) (0.466) 
Taxi # (log) -0.041 0.042 
(0.031) (0.138) 
Road area per capita (log)  0.018 0.024 
(0.016) (0.230) 
Industrial production (log) 0.012 0.372* 
(0.030) (0.203) 
Retail consumption (log) -0.017   0.715*** 
(0.030) (0.260) 
so2_939495_post 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) 
 
 
Under-identification test statistic  [7.07]***  
Weak identification test statistic   [6.80]***  
p-value for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.691  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
City fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 896 896 
R-squared 0.841 0.366 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at city level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
 
  
Table 5, Other robustness checks 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var:  log FDI 
Use 92-95 as pre-
treatment period Excl. Municipalities 
Excl. cites missing 
1998 FDI 
Excl. cities missing 
1995-1997 FDI 
          
TCZ * Post -0.414** -0.397*** -0.343** -0.295* 
(0.168) (0.146) (0.142) (0.171) 
College students # (log) 0.080 0.101 0.126* 0.086 
(0.067) (0.065) (0.070) (0.067) 
High school students # (log) -0.089 -0.167** -0.159* -0.073 
(0.095) (0.085) (0.083) (0.091) 
Telephone # (log) 0.308** 0.235 0.135 0.312** 
(0.139) (0.155) (0.155) (0.129) 
GDP growth rate -0.406 -0.152 0.189 -0.441 
(0.254) (0.303) (0.277) (0.281) 
Taxi # (log) -0.051 -0.085 -0.056 -0.048 
(0.070) (0.068) (0.065) (0.077) 
Road area per capita (log)  0.065 0.197* 0.378*** 0.063 
(0.100) (0.109) (0.086) (0.102) 
Industrial production (log) 0.368*** 0.346*** 0.272** 0.341*** 
(0.105) (0.102) (0.107) (0.102) 
Retail consumption (log) 0.286* 0.204 0.274 0.293* 
(0.160) (0.170) (0.179) (0.159) 
Constant -1.332 1.260 1.311 -1.274 
(2.043) (1.843) (2.375) (2.120) 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,970 2,501 2,329 2,849 
R-squared 0.398 0.406 0.429 0.402 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Appendix 1, Description of variables 
Variable name Description 
FDI (log) Actual FDI received in each year (10,000 USD) 
TCZ* post 
TCZ=1 if the city is designated to be TCZ, 0 otherwise; post=1 
if year is 1998 or afterwards, 0 otherwise 
College students  (log) Number of college students  
High school students  (log) Number of high school students 
Telephone (log) The number of telephone owned by every 10000 households 
GDP growth rate The growth rate of GDP 
Taxi  (log) Number of taxi  
Road area per capita (log)  Average paved road (square meters) 
Industrial production (log) Industrial output (10,000 CNY) 
Total wage(log) Total wages of staff and workers (10,000 CNY) 
Population (log) Total wage (10,000 persons) 
Tax revenue (log) Value-added tax (10,000 CNY) 
Retail consumption (log) Total retail sales of social consumption goods (10,000 CNY) 
  
Appendix 2, TCZ cities and their neighboring non-TCZ cities in China 
Province TCZ city  Neighboring non-TCZ cities 
Beijing  Langfang      
Tianjin  Langfang Cangzhou     
Hebei Shijiangzhuang  Jinzhong      
 
Tangshan  Qinhuangdao      
 
Handan  Liaocheng Changzhi Puyang    
 
Xingtai  Liaocheng Jinzhong     
 
Baoding  Langfang Cangzhou     
 
Zhangjiakou  Wulancabu      
 
Chengde  Caoyang Qinhuangdao     
 
Hengshui  Cangzhou      
Shanxi Taiyuan  Luliang Jinzhong    
 
Datong  Wulancabu      
 
Yangquan  Jinzhong     
Shuozhou  Wulanchabu      
 
Yuncheng  Jincheng 
 
Xinzhou  Luliang 
 
Linfen  Jincheng Changzhi 
Inner Mongolia Huhehaote  Wulancabu Eerduosi     
 
Baotou  Bayanzuoer Eerduosi     
 
Wuhai  Eerduosi      
Chifeng  Chaoyang Tongliao     
Liaoning Shenyang  Tieling      
 
Dalian  Yingkou Dandong     
 
Anshan  Panjin Yingkou Dandong    
 
Fushun  Tieling      
 
Benxi  Dandong      
 
Jinzhou  Panjin Chaoyang     
 
Fuxin  Tongliao Chaoyang     
 
Liaoyang  Dandong      
 
Huludao  Qinhuangdao Chaoyang     
Jinlin Jilin  Changchun Baishan     
Siping  Changchun Tieling Songyuan Tongliao   
 
Tonghua  Baishan      
Shanghai  Yancheng      
Jiangsu Nanjing  Huaian Yancheng     
 
Wuxi  Huaian Yancheng     
 
Xuzhou  Linyi Lianyungang Suqian Suzhou Huaibei  
 
Changzhou  Chuzhou      
Suzhou  Huaian Yancheng     
 
Nantong  Yancheng      
 
Yangzhou  Huaian Yancheng Chuzhou    
   
   Province TCZ city  Neighboring Non-TCZ cities 
 
Zhenjiang  Huaian      
 
Taizhou  Yancheng      
Zhejiang Hangzhou  Lishui Shangrao      
 
Ningbo  Zhoushan      
 
Wenzhou  Lishui Ningde     
 
Jiaxing  Zhoushan Lishui       
 
Huzhou  Zhoushan Chizhou      
 
Shaoxing  Lishui      
 
Jinhua  Lishui      
 
Quzhou  Lishui Shangrao     
 
Taizhou  Lishui      
Anhui Wuhu  Chizhou     
 
Manshan  Chuzhou      
Tongling  Anqing Chizhou  
 
Huangshan  Chizhou Jingdezhen Shangrao   
 
Xuancheng  Chizhou 
Fujian Fuzhou  Ningde Putian Nanping    
 
Xiamen  Putian      
 
Sanming  Nanping      
 
Quanzhou  Putian      
Zhangzhou  Meizhou      
 
Longyan  Meizhou      
Jiangxi Nanchang  Shangrao Yichun Fuzhou    
 
Pingxiang  Yichun     
 
Jiujiang  Huanggang Anqing Yichun Shangrao   
 
Yingtan  Shangrao Nanping Fuzhou    
 
Ganzhou  Heyuan     
Shandong Jinan  Liaocheng Binzhou     
 
Qingdao  Rizhao      
 
Zibo Dongying Binzhou Linyi    
 
Zaozhuang  Linyi      
Yantai  Weihai      
 
Weifang  Rizhao Dongying     
 
Jining  Linyi Heze Puyang    
 
Taian  Linyi      
 
Laiwu  Linyi      
 
Dezhou  Liaocheng Cangzhou Binzhou    
Henan Zhengzhou  Kaifeng Xinxiang Xuchang    
Luoyang  Jincheng Nanyang Pingdingshan    
 
Anyang  Changzhi Xinxiang Hebi Puyang   
 
Jiaozuo  Xinxiang Jincheng     
   
Appendix 2, TCZ cities and their neighboring non-TCZ cities in China (Cont.) 
Province TCZ city  Neighboring Non-TCZ cities 
 
Sanmenxia  Nanyang   
Hubei Wuhan  Huanggang Xiaogan     
Huangshi  Huanggang      
 
Yichang  Xiangfan      
 
Ezhou  Huanggang      
 
Jingmeng  Xiangfan Xiaogan Suizhou    
 
Jingzhou  Xiaogan      
 
Xianning  Huanggang      
Hunan Changsha  Yichun      
 
Zhuzhou  Yichun      
 
Xiangtan  Yichun      
 
Hengyang  Shaoyang Yongzhou    
 
Yueyang  Yichun      
Changde  Shaoyang     
 
Zhangjiajie  Shaoyang     
 
Yiyang  Shaoyang      
 
Chenzhou  Yongzhou      
 
Huaihua  Shaoyang     
 
Loudi  Shaoyang 
Guangdong Guangzhou  Heyuan      
Shaoguan  Heyuan      
 
Shenzhen  Heyuan      
 
Zhuhai  Yangjiang      
 
Shantou  Meizhou      
 
Foshan  Yangjiang      
 
Jiangmen  Yangjiang      
 
Zhanjiang  Maoming Beihai     
 
Zhaoqing  Yongzhou      
 
Huizhou  Heyuan      
 
Shanwei  Heyuan Meizhou     
 
Qingyuan  Yongzhou     
Dongguan  Heyuan      
 
Zhongshan  Yangjiang      
 
Chaozhou  Meizhou      
 
Jieyang  Meizhou      
 
Yunfu  Yangjiang Maoming     
Guangxi Nanning  Laibin Qinzhou Chongzuo    
 
Liuzhou  Laibin      
Guilin  Yongzhou      
 
Wuzhou  Laibin Guigang    
 
Guigang  Laibin      
   
   Province TCZ city  Neighboring Non-TCZ cities 
 
Yulin  Maoming Beihai Qinzhou Guigang   
 
Hezhou  Yongzhou 
Hechi  Baise Laibin 
Chongqing 
 
 Dazhou Guangan Ziyang    
Sichuan Chengdu  Yaan Ziyang    
 
Zigong  Laibin     
 
Panzhihua  Lijiang      
 
Luzhou  Ziyang      
 
Deyang  Ziyang      
 
Mianyang  Guangyuan Longlan     
 
Suining  Ziyang      
 
Neijiang  Ziyang      
 
Leshan  Yaan     
Nanchong  Guangyuan Bazhong Dazhou    
 
Yibin  Yaan Ziyang      
 
Guangan  Dazhou      
 
Meishan  Yaan Ziyang 
Guizhou Guiyang  Liupanshui      
 
Zunyi  Liupanshui      
 
Anshun  Liupanshui 
Yunnan Kunming  Simao Lincang      
 
Qujing  Liupanshui     
 
Yuxi  Simao Lincang 
 
Zhaotong  Lijiang Liupanshui 
Shaanxi Xian  Xianyang Baoji Ankang    
 
Tongchuan  Yanan Xianyang     
 
Weinan  Yanan Xianyang    
 
Shangluo  Ankang 
Gansu Lanzhou  Dingxi Wuwei     
 
Jinchang  Wuwei     
 
Baiyin  Wuwei Dingxi Guyuan Pingliang Zhongwei  
Zhangye  Jiuquan 
Ningxia Yinchuan  Wuzhong      
 
Shizuishan  Eerduosi      
Xinjiang Wulumuqi  Kelamayi      
 
   
   
   
   
   
Appendix 3, Balancing test for the matching 
    Mean     %reduction t-test   
Matching covariates  Sample Treated Control %bias  |bias|  t   p>|t| 
Total wage (log)  Unmatched 12.435 12.11 40 2.57 0.011 
Matched 12.22 12.11 13.4 66.3 0.82 0.415 
Population (log) Unmatched 5.7061 5.571 18.4 1.21 0.227 
Matched 5.629 5.571 7.9 57.2 0.44 0.664 
GDP (log) Unmatched 14.526 14.18 42.6 2.74 0.007 
Matched 14.276 14.18 12 71.8 0.71 0.48 
College students  (log) Unmatched 8.7284 8.33 29.6 1.88 0.062 
Matched 8.5188 8.33 14 52.6 0.79 0.433 
High school students  (log) Unmatched 12.075 12.01 9.9 0.64 0.521 
Matched 12.069 12.01 9 9.7 0.49 0.623 
Telephone (log) Unmatched 3.0911 2.743 39.7 2.5 0.013 
Matched 2.8524 2.743 12.5 68.5 0.78 0.435 
Road area per capita (log) Unmatched 1.3095 1.344 -5.9 -0.38 0.702 
Matched 1.3797 1.344 6.1 -3 0.37 0.713 
Tax revenue (log) Unmatched 11.285 10.81 49.3 3.2 0.002 
Matched 10.94 10.81 13.4 72.9 0.8 0.423 
Industrial production (log)  Unmatched 14.56 14.06 51.2 3.26 0.001 
  Matched 14.187 14.06 12.7 75.2 0.78 0.436 
Note: One-to-one matching is used to construct treatment-control pairs. Matching is based on the characteristics 
of each city prior to 1998 (average in 1992-97).   
 Appendix 4, Summary of time-variations of outcome variables used in the falsification tests during 1992-2009 (C.V.) 
 Variable: coefficient 
of variation Bus # 
Bus 
passenger # 
Middle 
school # 
Primary 
school # 
Primary 
school stu # 
Road 
area 
Mean 0.102 0.099 0.051 0.067 0.035 0.095 
S. E. of mean 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 
     
 
